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14.15J Networks (MIT) 14.15J Networks (MIT)

Description

Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form a Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form a

Subjects

networks | networks | crowds | crowds | markets | markets | highly connected world | highly connected world | social networks | social networks | economic networks | economic networks | power networks | power networks | communication networks | communication networks | game theory | game theory | graph theory | graph theory | branching processes | branching processes | random graph models | random graph models | rich get richer phenomena | rich get richer phenomena | power laws | power laws | small worlds | small worlds | Erd?s-Renyi graphs | Erd?s-Renyi graphs | degree distributions | degree distributions | phase transitions | phase transitions | connectedness | connectedness | and giant component | and giant component | link analysis | link analysis | web search | web search | navigation | navigation | decentralized search | decentralized search | preferential attachment | preferential attachment | epidemics | epidemics | diffusion through networks | diffusion through networks | SIR | SIR | (susceptible | (susceptible | infected | infected | removed) | removed) | SIS | SIS | susceptible) | susceptible) | strategies | strategies | payoffs | payoffs | normal forms | normal forms | Nash equilibrium | Nash equilibrium | traffic networks | traffic networks | negative externalities | negative externalities | Braess' paradox | Braess' paradox | potential games | potential games | myopic behavior | myopic behavior | fictitious play | fictitious play | repeated games | repeated games | prisoner's dilemma | prisoner's dilemma | cooperation | cooperation | perfect information | perfect information | imperfect information | imperfect information | positive externalities | positive externalities | strategic complements | strategic complements | path dependence | path dependence | diffusion of innovation | diffusion of innovation | contagion pheonomena | contagion pheonomena | Bayes's rule | Bayes's rule | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | first price auctions | first price auctions | second price auctions | second price auctions | social learning | social learning | Bayesian learning | Bayesian learning | copying | copying | herding | herding | herd behavior | herd behavior | informational cascades | informational cascades | decisions | decisions | social choice | social choice | Condorcet jury theorem | Condorcet jury theorem | political economy | political economy

License

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6.972 Game Theory and Mechanism Design (MIT) 6.972 Game Theory and Mechanism Design (MIT)

Description

This course is offered to graduates and is an introduction to fundamentals of game theory and mechanism design with motivations drawn from various applications including distributed control of wireline and wireless communication networks, incentive-compatible/dynamic resource allocation, and pricing. Emphasis is placed on the foundations of the theory, mathematical tools, as well as modeling and the equilibrium notions in different environments. Topics covered include: normal form games, learning in games, supermodular games, potential games, dynamic games, subgame perfect equilibrium, bargaining, repeated games, auctions, mechanism design, cooperative game theory, network and congestion games, and price of anarchy. This course is offered to graduates and is an introduction to fundamentals of game theory and mechanism design with motivations drawn from various applications including distributed control of wireline and wireless communication networks, incentive-compatible/dynamic resource allocation, and pricing. Emphasis is placed on the foundations of the theory, mathematical tools, as well as modeling and the equilibrium notions in different environments. Topics covered include: normal form games, learning in games, supermodular games, potential games, dynamic games, subgame perfect equilibrium, bargaining, repeated games, auctions, mechanism design, cooperative game theory, network and congestion games, and price of anarchy.

Subjects

game theory | game theory | mechanism design | mechanism design | mathematical tools | mathematical tools | normal form games | normal form games | existence and computation of equilibria | existence and computation of equilibria | supermodular games | supermodular games | potential games | potential games | subgame perfect equilibrium | subgame perfect equilibrium | dynamic games | dynamic games | bargaining | bargaining | repeated games | repeated games | games with incomplete/imperfect information | games with incomplete/imperfect information | auctions | auctions | cooperative game theory | cooperative game theory | network and congestion games | network and congestion games | pricing | pricing | price of anarchy | price of anarchy

License

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14.16 Strategy and Information (MIT)

Description

This is an advanced course in game theory. We begin with a rigorous overview of the main equilibrium concepts for non-­cooperative games in both static and dynamic settings with either complete or incomplete information. We define and explore properties of iterated strict dominance, rationalizability, Nash equilibrium, subgame perfection, sequential, perfect and proper equilibria, the intuitive criterion, and iterated weak dominance. We discuss applications to auctions, bargaining, and repeated games. Then we introduce solution concepts for cooperative games and study non-­cooperative implementations. Other topics include matching theory and networks. 

Subjects

game theory | iterated dominance | rationalizability | Nash equilibirum | subgame perfection | perfect Bayesian equilibrium | sequential equilibrium | perfect equilibrium | proper equilibrium | bargaining | networks

License

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14.12 Economic Applications of Game Theory (MIT) 14.12 Economic Applications of Game Theory (MIT)

Description

Game Theory, also known as Multiperson Decision Theory, is the analysis of situations in which the payoff of a decision maker depends not only on his own actions but also on those of others. Game Theory has applications in several fiÂ…elds, such as economics, politics, law, biology, and computer science. In this course, I will introduce the basic tools of game theoretic analysis. In the process, I will outline some of the many applications of Game Theory, primarily in economics. Game Theory, also known as Multiperson Decision Theory, is the analysis of situations in which the payoff of a decision maker depends not only on his own actions but also on those of others. Game Theory has applications in several fiÂ…elds, such as economics, politics, law, biology, and computer science. In this course, I will introduce the basic tools of game theoretic analysis. In the process, I will outline some of the many applications of Game Theory, primarily in economics.

Subjects

game theory | game theory | economics | economics | multiperson decision theory | multiperson decision theory | payoff | payoff | games | games | backward induction | backward induction | subgame perfection | subgame perfection | implicit cartels | implicit cartels | dynamic games | dynamic games

License

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14.123 Microeconomic Theory III (MIT) 14.123 Microeconomic Theory III (MIT)

Description

This half-semester course discusses decision theory and topics in game theory. We present models of individual decision-making under certainty and uncertainty. Topics include preference orderings, expected utility, risk, stochastic dominance, supermodularity, monotone comparative statics, background risk, game theory, rationalizability, iterated strict dominance multi-stage games, sequential equilibrium, trembling-hand perfection, stability, signaling games, theory of auctions, global games, repeated games, and correlation. This half-semester course discusses decision theory and topics in game theory. We present models of individual decision-making under certainty and uncertainty. Topics include preference orderings, expected utility, risk, stochastic dominance, supermodularity, monotone comparative statics, background risk, game theory, rationalizability, iterated strict dominance multi-stage games, sequential equilibrium, trembling-hand perfection, stability, signaling games, theory of auctions, global games, repeated games, and correlation.

Subjects

microeconomics | microeconomics | microeconomic theory | microeconomic theory | preference | preference | utility representation | utility representation | expected utility | expected utility | positive interpretation | positive interpretation | normative interpretation | normative interpretation | risk | risk | stochastic dominance | stochastic dominance | insurance | insurance | finance | finance | supermodularity | supermodularity | comparative statics | comparative statics | decision theory | decision theory | game theory | game theory | rationalizability | rationalizability | iterated strict dominance | iterated strict dominance | iterated conditional dominance | iterated conditional dominance | bargaining | bargaining | equilibrium | equilibrium | sequential equilibrium | sequential equilibrium | trembling-hand perfection | trembling-hand perfection | signaling games | signaling games | auctions | auctions | global games | global games | repeated games | repeated games | correlation | correlation

License

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TALAT Lecture 2401: Fatigue Behaviour and Analysis

Description

This lecture explains why, when and where fatigue problems may arise and the special significance to aluminium as structural material; it helps to understand the effects of material and loading parameters on fatigue; to appreciate the statistical nature of fatigue and its importance in data analysis, evaluation and use; it shows how to estimate fatigue life under service conditions of time-dependent, variable amplitude loading; how to estimate stresses acting in notches and welds with conceptual approaches other than nominal stress; it provides qualitative and quantitative information on the classification of welded details and allow for more sophisticated design procedures. Background in materials engineering, design and fatigue is required.

Subjects

aluminium | aluminum | european aluminium association | eaa | talat | training in aluminium application technologies | training | metallurgy | technology | lecture | design | fatigue | fatigue cracks | susceptibility | cyclic loading | crack growth | crack propagation rate | endurance limit | predictive theories | damage accumulation theories | manson-coffin law | crack growth laws | ideal cumulative damage theory | fatigue data analysis | middle-cycle fatigue range | high-cycle fatigue range | fatigue diagrams | linear p-s-n curves | non-linear p-s-n curves | service behaviour | time dependent loads | load spectrum | cycle counting | rain-flow cycle counting method | service behaviour fatigue test | analytical life estimation | damage accumulation | palmgren-miner linear damage accumulation hypothesis | strain | fatigue life | notch theory | strain-life diagram | weld imperfections | static strength | fatigue strength | cracks | porosity | inclusions | oxides | lack of penetration | weld shape | lack of fusion | geometric misalignment | arc strike | spatter | post-weld mechanical imperfections | corematerials | ukoer | Engineering | H000

License

Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/

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14.461 Advanced Macroeconomics I (MIT) 14.461 Advanced Macroeconomics I (MIT)

Description

This course covers three sets of topics. The first part will cover business cycle models with imperfect information. We will ask questions such as: What shocks drive business cycles? What is the relative role of shocks to fundamentals and shocks affecting expectations about (current and future) economic developments? How do informational frictions affect the shape of the responses to various shocks? The second part will cover models of investment with credit constraints. We will ask questions such as: What is the transmission mechanism from shocks to the financial sector to the real economy? What determines optimal decisions about capitalization at the individual and at the social level? The third part will cover search models of decentralized trade applied both to labor markets and to This course covers three sets of topics. The first part will cover business cycle models with imperfect information. We will ask questions such as: What shocks drive business cycles? What is the relative role of shocks to fundamentals and shocks affecting expectations about (current and future) economic developments? How do informational frictions affect the shape of the responses to various shocks? The second part will cover models of investment with credit constraints. We will ask questions such as: What is the transmission mechanism from shocks to the financial sector to the real economy? What determines optimal decisions about capitalization at the individual and at the social level? The third part will cover search models of decentralized trade applied both to labor markets and to

Subjects

news about the future and fluctuations | news about the future and fluctuations | dispersed information | dispersed information | estimating models with imperfect information | estimating models with imperfect information | models with limited pledgeability | models with limited pledgeability | models with corporate control problems | models with corporate control problems | models with intermediation and securitization | models with intermediation and securitization | financial frictions | financial frictions | investment | investment | labor market search and inefficiency | labor market search and inefficiency | wage dispersion | wage dispersion | moral hazard | moral hazard | optimal unemployment insurance | optimal unemployment insurance | money search | money search | liquidity | liquidity | adverse selection and lemons problem | adverse selection and lemons problem | decentralized trading in financial markets | decentralized trading in financial markets

License

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RES.LL-005 D4M: Signal Processing on Databases (MIT) RES.LL-005 D4M: Signal Processing on Databases (MIT)

Description

Includes audio/video content: AV lectures. D4M is a breakthrough in computer programming that combines graph theory, linear algebra, and databases to address problems associated with Big Data. Search, social media, ad placement, mapping, tracking, spam filtering, fraud detection, wireless communication, drug discovery, and bioinformatics all attempt to find items of interest in vast quantities of data. This course teaches a signal processing approach to these problems by combining linear algebraic graph algorithms, group theory, and database design. This approach has been implemented in software The class will begin with a number of practical problems, introduce the appropriate theory and then apply the theory to these problems. Students will apply these ideas in the final project of their Includes audio/video content: AV lectures. D4M is a breakthrough in computer programming that combines graph theory, linear algebra, and databases to address problems associated with Big Data. Search, social media, ad placement, mapping, tracking, spam filtering, fraud detection, wireless communication, drug discovery, and bioinformatics all attempt to find items of interest in vast quantities of data. This course teaches a signal processing approach to these problems by combining linear algebraic graph algorithms, group theory, and database design. This approach has been implemented in software The class will begin with a number of practical problems, introduce the appropriate theory and then apply the theory to these problems. Students will apply these ideas in the final project of their

Subjects

big data | big data | data analytics | data analytics | dynamic distributed dimensional data model | dynamic distributed dimensional data model | D4M | D4M | associate arrays | associate arrays | group theory | group theory | entity analysis | entity analysis | perfect Power Law | perfect Power Law | bio sequence correlation | bio sequence correlation | Accumulo | Accumulo | Kronecker graphs | Kronecker graphs

License

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14.386 New Econometric Methods (MIT) 14.386 New Econometric Methods (MIT)

Description

This course focuses on recent developments in econometrics, especially structural estimation. The topics include nonseparable models, models of imperfect competition, auction models, duration models, and nonlinear panel data. Results are illustrated with economic applications. This course focuses on recent developments in econometrics, especially structural estimation. The topics include nonseparable models, models of imperfect competition, auction models, duration models, and nonlinear panel data. Results are illustrated with economic applications.

Subjects

econometrics | econometrics | recent developments | recent developments | structural estimation | structural estimation | nonseparable models | nonseparable models | models of imperfect competition | models of imperfect competition | auction models | auction models | duration models | duration models | and nonlinear panel data | and nonlinear panel data | economic applications | economic applications

License

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6.972 Game Theory and Mechanism Design (MIT)

Description

This course is offered to graduates and is an introduction to fundamentals of game theory and mechanism design with motivations drawn from various applications including distributed control of wireline and wireless communication networks, incentive-compatible/dynamic resource allocation, and pricing. Emphasis is placed on the foundations of the theory, mathematical tools, as well as modeling and the equilibrium notions in different environments. Topics covered include: normal form games, learning in games, supermodular games, potential games, dynamic games, subgame perfect equilibrium, bargaining, repeated games, auctions, mechanism design, cooperative game theory, network and congestion games, and price of anarchy.

Subjects

game theory | mechanism design | mathematical tools | normal form games | existence and computation of equilibria | supermodular games | potential games | subgame perfect equilibrium | dynamic games | bargaining | repeated games | games with incomplete/imperfect information | auctions | cooperative game theory | network and congestion games | pricing | price of anarchy

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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24.973 Advanced Semantics (MIT) 24.973 Advanced Semantics (MIT)

Description

This course is the second of the three parts of our graduate introduction to semantics. The others are 24.970 Introduction to Semantics and 24.954 Pragmatics in Linguistic Theory. Like the other courses, this one is not meant as an overview of the field and its current developments. Our aim is to help you to develop the ability for semantic analysis, and we think that exploring a few topics in detail together with hands-on practical work is more effective than offering a bird's-eye view of everything. Once you have gained some experience in doing semantic analysis, reading around in the many recent handbooks and in current issues of major journals and attending our seminars and colloquia will give you all you need to prosper. Because we want to focus, we need to make difficult choices as This course is the second of the three parts of our graduate introduction to semantics. The others are 24.970 Introduction to Semantics and 24.954 Pragmatics in Linguistic Theory. Like the other courses, this one is not meant as an overview of the field and its current developments. Our aim is to help you to develop the ability for semantic analysis, and we think that exploring a few topics in detail together with hands-on practical work is more effective than offering a bird's-eye view of everything. Once you have gained some experience in doing semantic analysis, reading around in the many recent handbooks and in current issues of major journals and attending our seminars and colloquia will give you all you need to prosper. Because we want to focus, we need to make difficult choices as

Subjects

semantics | semantics | logic | logic | meaning | meaning | syntactic systems | syntactic systems | generative grammar | generative grammar | displacement | displacement | intensional semantics | intensional semantics | Hintikka's idea | Hintikka's idea | accessibility relations | accessibility relations | modality | modality | quantificational theory of modality | quantificational theory of modality | material implication analysis | material implication analysis | strict implication analysis | strict implication analysis | tense | tense | conditionals | conditionals | progressive | progressive | perfect | perfect | de re | de re | de dicto | de dicto | raised subjects | raised subjects | scope paradox | scope paradox | overt world variables | overt world variables | restrictors | restrictors | syntax movement | syntax movement | wh-movement | wh-movement | DP | DP | VP | VP

License

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14.20 Industrial Organization and Public Policy (MIT) 14.20 Industrial Organization and Public Policy (MIT)

Description

This is a course in industrial organization, the study of firms in markets. Industrial organization focuses on firm behavior in imperfectly competitive markets, which appear to be far more common than the perfectly competitive markets that were the focus of your basic microeconomics course. This field analyzes the acquisition and use of market power by firms, strategic interactions among firms, and the role of government competition policy. We will approach this subject from both theoretical and applied perspectives. This is a course in industrial organization, the study of firms in markets. Industrial organization focuses on firm behavior in imperfectly competitive markets, which appear to be far more common than the perfectly competitive markets that were the focus of your basic microeconomics course. This field analyzes the acquisition and use of market power by firms, strategic interactions among firms, and the role of government competition policy. We will approach this subject from both theoretical and applied perspectives.

Subjects

government | government | market power | market power | strategy | strategy | economics | economics | game theory | game theory | monopoly | monopoly | oligopoly | oligopoly | pricing | pricing | spatial model | spatial model | public policy | public policy | competitive markets | competitive markets | firm behavior | firm behavior | industrial organization | industrial organization | imperfectly competitive markets | imperfectly competitive markets | firm acquisition | firm acquisition | government competition policy | government competition policy | market power firms | market power firms | dynamic games | dynamic games

License

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6.231 Dynamic Programming and Stochastic Control (MIT) 6.231 Dynamic Programming and Stochastic Control (MIT)

Description

The course covers the basic models and solution techniques for problems of sequential decision making under uncertainty (stochastic control). We will consider optimal control of a dynamical system over both a finite and an infinite number of stages. This includes systems with finite or infinite state spaces, as well as perfectly or imperfectly observed systems. We will also discuss approximation methods for problems involving large state spaces. Applications of dynamic programming in a variety of fields will be covered in recitations. The course covers the basic models and solution techniques for problems of sequential decision making under uncertainty (stochastic control). We will consider optimal control of a dynamical system over both a finite and an infinite number of stages. This includes systems with finite or infinite state spaces, as well as perfectly or imperfectly observed systems. We will also discuss approximation methods for problems involving large state spaces. Applications of dynamic programming in a variety of fields will be covered in recitations.

Subjects

dynamic programming | dynamic programming | stochastic control | stochastic control | algorithms | algorithms | finite-state | finite-state | continuous-time | continuous-time | imperfect state information | imperfect state information | suboptimal control | suboptimal control | finite horizon | finite horizon | infinite horizon | infinite horizon | discounted problems | discounted problems | stochastic shortest path | stochastic shortest path | approximate dynamic programming | approximate dynamic programming

License

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11.437 Financing Economic Development (MIT) 11.437 Financing Economic Development (MIT)

Description

This course focuses on financing tools and program models to support local economic development. It includes an overview of private capital markets and financing sources to understand capital market imperfections that constrain economic development; business accounting; financial statement analysis; federal economic development programs; and public finance tools. Program models covered include revolving loan funds, guarantee programs, venture capital funds, bank holding companies, community development loan funds and credit unions, micro enterprise funds, and the use of the Community Reinvestment Act to leverage bank financing.Technical RequirementsMicrosoft® Excel software is recommended for viewing the .xls files found on this course site. Free Microsoft® Excel This course focuses on financing tools and program models to support local economic development. It includes an overview of private capital markets and financing sources to understand capital market imperfections that constrain economic development; business accounting; financial statement analysis; federal economic development programs; and public finance tools. Program models covered include revolving loan funds, guarantee programs, venture capital funds, bank holding companies, community development loan funds and credit unions, micro enterprise funds, and the use of the Community Reinvestment Act to leverage bank financing.Technical RequirementsMicrosoft® Excel software is recommended for viewing the .xls files found on this course site. Free Microsoft® Excel

Subjects

financing tools | financing tools | program models to support local economic development | program models to support local economic development | private capital markets | private capital markets | financing sources | financing sources | capital market imperfections | capital market imperfections | economic development | economic development | business accounting | business accounting | financial statement analysis | financial statement analysis | federal economic development programs | federal economic development programs | public finance tools | public finance tools | funds | funds | guarantee programs | guarantee programs | venture capital funds | venture capital funds | bank holding companies | bank holding companies | community development loan funds | community development loan funds | credit unions | credit unions | micro enterprise funds | micro enterprise funds | use of the Community Reinvestment Act to leverage bank financing | use of the Community Reinvestment Act to leverage bank financing | Community Reinvestment Act | Community Reinvestment Act | bank financing | bank financing | program management | program management

License

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6.254 Game Theory with Engineering Applications (MIT) 6.254 Game Theory with Engineering Applications (MIT)

Description

This course is an introduction to the fundamentals of game theory and mechanism design. Motivations are drawn from engineered/networked systems (including distributed control of wireline and wireless communication networks, incentive-compatible/dynamic resource allocation, multi-agent systems, pricing and investment decisions in the Internet), and social models (including social and economic networks). The course emphasizes theoretical foundations, mathematical tools, modeling, and equilibrium notions in different environments. This course is an introduction to the fundamentals of game theory and mechanism design. Motivations are drawn from engineered/networked systems (including distributed control of wireline and wireless communication networks, incentive-compatible/dynamic resource allocation, multi-agent systems, pricing and investment decisions in the Internet), and social models (including social and economic networks). The course emphasizes theoretical foundations, mathematical tools, modeling, and equilibrium notions in different environments.

Subjects

game theory | game theory | strategic form games | strategic form games | learning | evolution | and computation | learning | evolution | and computation | extensive games with perfect information | extensive games with perfect information | repeated games | repeated games | games with incomplete information | games with incomplete information | mechanism design | mechanism design | network effects | network effects | games over networks | games over networks

License

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11.437 Financing Economic Development (MIT) 11.437 Financing Economic Development (MIT)

Description

This course focuses on financing tools and program models to support local economic development. It includes an overview of private capital markets and financing sources to understand capital market imperfections that constrain economic development; business accounting; financial statement analysis; federal economic development programs; and public finance tools. Program models covered include revolving loan funds, guarantee programs, venture capital funds, bank holding companies, community development loan funds and credit unions, micro enterprise funds, and the use of the Community Reinvestment Act to leverage bank financing. This course focuses on financing tools and program models to support local economic development. It includes an overview of private capital markets and financing sources to understand capital market imperfections that constrain economic development; business accounting; financial statement analysis; federal economic development programs; and public finance tools. Program models covered include revolving loan funds, guarantee programs, venture capital funds, bank holding companies, community development loan funds and credit unions, micro enterprise funds, and the use of the Community Reinvestment Act to leverage bank financing.

Subjects

financing tools | financing tools | program models to support local economic development | program models to support local economic development | private capital markets | private capital markets | financing sources | financing sources | capital market imperfections | capital market imperfections | economic development | economic development | business accounting | business accounting | financial statement analysis | financial statement analysis | federal economic development programs | federal economic development programs | public finance tools | public finance tools | funds | funds | guarantee programs | guarantee programs | venture capital funds | venture capital funds | bank holding companies | bank holding companies | community development loan funds | community development loan funds | credit unions | credit unions | micro enterprise funds | micro enterprise funds | use of the Community Reinvestment Act to leverage bank financing | use of the Community Reinvestment Act to leverage bank financing

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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18.327 Wavelets, Filter Banks and Applications (MIT) 18.327 Wavelets, Filter Banks and Applications (MIT)

Description

Wavelets are localized basis functions, good for representing short-time events. The coefficients at each scale are filtered and subsampled to give coefficients at the next scale. This is Mallat's pyramid algorithm for multiresolution, connecting wavelets to filter banks. Wavelets and multiscale algorithms for compression and signal/image processing are developed. Subject is project-based for engineering and scientific applications. Wavelets are localized basis functions, good for representing short-time events. The coefficients at each scale are filtered and subsampled to give coefficients at the next scale. This is Mallat's pyramid algorithm for multiresolution, connecting wavelets to filter banks. Wavelets and multiscale algorithms for compression and signal/image processing are developed. Subject is project-based for engineering and scientific applications.

Subjects

Discrete-time filters | Discrete-time filters | convolution | convolution | Fourier transform | Fourier transform | owpass and highpass filters | owpass and highpass filters | Sampling rate change operations | Sampling rate change operations | upsampling and downsampling | upsampling and downsampling | ractional sampling | ractional sampling | interpolation | interpolation | Filter Banks | Filter Banks | time domain (Haar example) and frequency domain | time domain (Haar example) and frequency domain | conditions for alias cancellation and no distortion | conditions for alias cancellation and no distortion | perfect reconstruction | perfect reconstruction | halfband filters and possible factorizations | halfband filters and possible factorizations | Modulation and polyphase representations | Modulation and polyphase representations | Noble identities | Noble identities | block Toeplitz matrices and block z-transforms | block Toeplitz matrices and block z-transforms | polyphase examples | polyphase examples | Matlab wavelet toolbox | Matlab wavelet toolbox | Orthogonal filter banks | Orthogonal filter banks | paraunitary matrices | paraunitary matrices | orthogonality condition (Condition O) in the time domain | orthogonality condition (Condition O) in the time domain | modulation domain and polyphase domain | modulation domain and polyphase domain | Maxflat filters | Maxflat filters | Daubechies and Meyer formulas | Daubechies and Meyer formulas | Spectral factorization | Spectral factorization | Multiresolution Analysis (MRA) | Multiresolution Analysis (MRA) | requirements for MRA | requirements for MRA | nested spaces and complementary spaces; scaling functions and wavelets | nested spaces and complementary spaces; scaling functions and wavelets | Refinement equation | Refinement equation | iterative and recursive solution techniques | iterative and recursive solution techniques | infinite product formula | infinite product formula | filter bank approach for computing scaling functions and wavelets | filter bank approach for computing scaling functions and wavelets | Orthogonal wavelet bases | Orthogonal wavelet bases | connection to orthogonal filters | connection to orthogonal filters | orthogonality in the frequency domain | orthogonality in the frequency domain | Biorthogonal wavelet bases | Biorthogonal wavelet bases | Mallat pyramid algorithm | Mallat pyramid algorithm | Accuracy of wavelet approximations (Condition A) | Accuracy of wavelet approximations (Condition A) | vanishing moments | vanishing moments | polynomial cancellation in filter banks | polynomial cancellation in filter banks | Smoothness of wavelet bases | Smoothness of wavelet bases | convergence of the cascade algorithm (Condition E) | convergence of the cascade algorithm (Condition E) | splines | splines | Bases vs. frames | Bases vs. frames | Signal and image processing | Signal and image processing | finite length signals | finite length signals | boundary filters and boundary wavelets | boundary filters and boundary wavelets | wavelet compression algorithms | wavelet compression algorithms | Lifting | Lifting | ladder structure for filter banks | ladder structure for filter banks | factorization of polyphase matrix into lifting steps | factorization of polyphase matrix into lifting steps | lifting form of refinement equationSec | lifting form of refinement equationSec | Wavelets and subdivision | Wavelets and subdivision | nonuniform grids | nonuniform grids | multiresolution for triangular meshes | multiresolution for triangular meshes | representation and compression of surfaces | representation and compression of surfaces | Numerical solution of PDEs | Numerical solution of PDEs | Galerkin approximation | Galerkin approximation | wavelet integrals (projection coefficients | moments and connection coefficients) | wavelet integrals (projection coefficients | moments and connection coefficients) | convergence | convergence | Subdivision wavelets for integral equations | Subdivision wavelets for integral equations | Compression and convergence estimates | Compression and convergence estimates | M-band wavelets | M-band wavelets | DFT filter banks and cosine modulated filter banks | DFT filter banks and cosine modulated filter banks | Multiwavelets | Multiwavelets

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TALAT Lecture 2401: Fatigue Behaviour and Analysis

Description

This lecture explains why, when and where fatigue problems may arise and the special significance to aluminium as structural material; it helps to understand the effects of material and loading parameters on fatigue; to appreciate the statistical nature of fatigue and its importance in data analysis, evaluation and use; it shows how to estimate fatigue life under service conditions of time-dependent, variable amplitude loading; how to estimate stresses acting in notches and welds with conceptual approaches other than nominal stress; it provides qualitative and quantitative information on the classification of welded details and allow for more sophisticated design procedures. Background in materials engineering, design and fatigue is required.

Subjects

aluminium | aluminum | european aluminium association | EAA | Training in Aluminium Application Technologies | training | metallurgy | technology | lecture | design | fatigue | fatigue cracks | susceptibility | cyclic loading | crack growth | crack propagation rate | endurance limit | predictive theories | damage accumulation theories | Manson-Coffin law | crack growth laws | ideal cumulative damage theory | fatigue data analysis | middle-cycle fatigue range | high-cycle fatigue range | fatigue diagrams | linear P-S-N curves | non-linear P-S-N curves | service behaviour | time dependent loads | load spectrum | cycle counting | rain-flow cycle counting method | service behaviour fatigue test | analytical life estimation | damage accumulation | Palmgren-Miner linear damage accumulation hypothesis | strain | fatigue life | notch theory | strain-life diagram | weld imperfections | static strength | fatigue strength | cracks | porosity | inclusions | oxides | lack of penetration | weld shape | lack of fusion | geometric misalignment | arc strike | spatter | post-weld mechanical imperfections | corematerials | ukoer

License

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15.024 Applied Economics for Managers (MIT) 15.024 Applied Economics for Managers (MIT)

Description

The fact of scarcity forces individuals, firms, and societies to choose among alternative uses – or allocations – of its limited resources. Accordingly, the first part of this summer course seeks to understand how economists model the choice process of individual consumers and firms, and how markets work to coordinate these choices. It also examines how well markets perform this function using the economist's criterion of market efficiency. Overall, this course focuses on microeconomics, with some topics from macroeconomics and international trade. It emphasizes the integration of theory, data, and judgment in the analysis of corporate decisions and public policy, and in the assessment of changing U.S. and international business environments. The fact of scarcity forces individuals, firms, and societies to choose among alternative uses – or allocations – of its limited resources. Accordingly, the first part of this summer course seeks to understand how economists model the choice process of individual consumers and firms, and how markets work to coordinate these choices. It also examines how well markets perform this function using the economist's criterion of market efficiency. Overall, this course focuses on microeconomics, with some topics from macroeconomics and international trade. It emphasizes the integration of theory, data, and judgment in the analysis of corporate decisions and public policy, and in the assessment of changing U.S. and international business environments.

Subjects

applied economics | applied economics | resource scarcity | resource scarcity | allocate limited resources | allocate limited resources | business choices | business choices | modeling consumer choices | modeling consumer choices | market efficiency | market efficiency | microeconomics | microeconomics | efficiency | efficiency | supply | supply | demand | demand | consumer theory | consumer theory | producer theory | producer theory | monopoly | monopoly | imperfect competition | imperfect competition | pricing | pricing | public goods | public goods | externalities | externalities | information uncertainty | information uncertainty | group decision making | group decision making | organizational architecture | organizational architecture | international trade | international trade | equity | equity | income distribution | income distribution | economic rewards | economic rewards | managerial economics | managerial economics | corporate finance theory | corporate finance theory | network economy | network economy

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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ía (2012) ía (2012)

Description

Este curso tiene como objetivo introducir a los estudiantes en el análisis formal y comprensión del funcionamiento de los mercados bajo estructuras no competitivas, profundizando en algunos de los elementos que se introdujeron someramente en la asignatura de Introducción de primer curso, como los fallos de mercado ligados a la existencia de bienes públicos o de información asimétrica. Por otro lado, se hace especial hincapié en el análisis de mercados no competitivos ligados a la presencia de monopolios, oligopolios o agentes con poder de mercado. En todo ello será fundamental emplear la teoría como un instrumento escalrecedor de un amplio conjunto de fenómenos reales, mediante el recurso frecuente a los ejemplos de la realidad cotidiana. Este curso tiene como objetivo introducir a los estudiantes en el análisis formal y comprensión del funcionamiento de los mercados bajo estructuras no competitivas, profundizando en algunos de los elementos que se introdujeron someramente en la asignatura de Introducción de primer curso, como los fallos de mercado ligados a la existencia de bienes públicos o de información asimétrica. Por otro lado, se hace especial hincapié en el análisis de mercados no competitivos ligados a la presencia de monopolios, oligopolios o agentes con poder de mercado. En todo ello será fundamental emplear la teoría como un instrumento escalrecedor de un amplio conjunto de fenómenos reales, mediante el recurso frecuente a los ejemplos de la realidad cotidiana.

Subjects

álisis Económico | álisis Económico | ón en precios | ón en precios | álisis de la competencia en mercados | álisis de la competencia en mercados | Competencia perfecta | Competencia perfecta | Poder de Mercado | Poder de Mercado | Monopolio | Monopolio | Oligopolio | Oligopolio

License

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Introduction to microeconomics

Description

This is a module framework. It can be viewed online or downloaded as a zip file. As taught Semester 1 2009/2010. There are no pre-requisites to taking this module and in particular there is no assumption of any prior knowledge of economics. For those who have taken A-level economics or any other version of economics some of the module content will appear familiar to you. However, the methods of analysis and the approach to teaching will quite probably be very different to anything experienced before and thus it is very important that good lecture notes are made, essays are thoughtfully written and background reading is undertaken. If not, then a degree level of understanding of the material will not be achieved. This module is suitable for study at undergraduate level 1 Dr Wyn Morgan Dr Wy

Subjects

ukoer | microeconomics | microeconomic theory | consumer theory | consumer welfare and the household as supplier | the firm's supply | perfectly competitive markets | imperfectly competitive markets | market failure | economics | administrative studies | N000

License

Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 2.0 UK: England & Wales http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.0/uk/

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14.454 Macroeconomic Theory IV (MIT) 14.454 Macroeconomic Theory IV (MIT)

Description

This half-term course covers the macroeconomic implications of imperfections in labor markets, goods markets, credit and financial markets. The role of nominal rigidities is also an area of focus. This half-term course covers the macroeconomic implications of imperfections in labor markets, goods markets, credit and financial markets. The role of nominal rigidities is also an area of focus.

Subjects

macroeconomic implications of imperfections in labor markets | macroeconomic implications of imperfections in labor markets | macroeconomics | macroeconomics | goods markets | goods markets | credit markets | credit markets | financial markets | financial markets | nominal rigidities | nominal rigidities

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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14.01SC Principles of Microeconomics (MIT) 14.01SC Principles of Microeconomics (MIT)

Description

Includes audio/video content: AV lectures. 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics is an introductory undergraduate course that teaches the fundamentals of microeconomics. This course introduces microeconomic concepts and analysis, supply and demand analysis, theories of the firm and individual behavior, competition and monopoly, and welfare economics. Students will also be introduced to the use of microeconomic applications to address problems in current economic policy throughout the semester. This course is a core subject in MIT's undergraduate Energy Studies Minor. This Institute-wide program complements the deep expertise obtained in any major with a broad understanding of the interlinked realms of science, technology, and social sciences as they relate to energy and associated environmen Includes audio/video content: AV lectures. 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics is an introductory undergraduate course that teaches the fundamentals of microeconomics. This course introduces microeconomic concepts and analysis, supply and demand analysis, theories of the firm and individual behavior, competition and monopoly, and welfare economics. Students will also be introduced to the use of microeconomic applications to address problems in current economic policy throughout the semester. This course is a core subject in MIT's undergraduate Energy Studies Minor. This Institute-wide program complements the deep expertise obtained in any major with a broad understanding of the interlinked realms of science, technology, and social sciences as they relate to energy and associated environmen

Subjects

Microeconomics | Microeconomics | prices | prices | normative economics | normative economics | positive economics | positive economics | microeconomic applications | microeconomic applications | supply | supply | demand | demand | equilibrium | equilibrium | demand shift | demand shift | supply shift | supply shift | government interference | government interference | elasticity | elasticity | revenue | revenue | empirical economics | empirical economics | consumer theory | consumer theory | preference assumptions | preference assumptions | indifference curves | indifference curves | utility functions | utility functions | marginal utility | marginal utility | budget constraints | budget constraints | marginal rate of transformation | marginal rate of transformation | opportunity cost | opportunity cost | constrained utility maximization | constrained utility maximization | corner solutions | corner solutions | Engel curves | Engel curves | income effect | income effect | substitution effect | substitution effect | Giffin good | Giffin good | labor economics | labor economics | child labor | child labor | producer theory | producer theory | variable inputs | variable inputs | fixed inputs | fixed inputs | firm production functions | firm production functions | marginal rate of technical substitution | marginal rate of technical substitution | returns to scale | returns to scale | productivity | productivity | perfect competition | perfect competition | search theory | search theory | residual demand | residual demand | shutdown decisions | shutdown decisions | market equilibrium | market equilibrium | agency problem | agency problem | welfare economics | welfare economics | consumer surplus | consumer surplus | producer surplus | producer surplus | dead weight loss | dead weight loss | monopoly | monopoly | oligopoly | oligopoly | market power | market power | price discrimination | price discrimination | price regulation | price regulation | antitrust policy | antitrust policy | mergers | mergers | cartel | cartel | game theory | game theory | Nash equilibrium | Nash equilibrium | Cournot model | Cournot model | duopoly | duopoly | non-cooperative competition | non-cooperative competition | Bertrand competition | Bertrand competition | factor markets | factor markets | international trade | international trade | uncertainty | uncertainty | capital markets | capital markets | intertemporal choice | intertemporal choice | real interest rate | real interest rate | compounding | compounding | inflation | inflation | investment | investment | discount rate | discount rate | net present value | net present value | income distribution | income distribution | social welfare function | social welfare function | Utilitarianism | Utilitarianism | Raulsian criteria | Raulsian criteria | Nozickian | Nozickian | commodity egalitarianism | commodity egalitarianism | isowelfare curves | isowelfare curves | social insurance | social insurance | social security | social security | moral hazard | moral hazard | taxation | taxation | EITC | EITC | healthcare | healthcare | PPACA | PPACA

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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17.881 Game Theory and Political Theory (MIT) 17.881 Game Theory and Political Theory (MIT)

Description

Increasingly, political scientists are using game theory to analyze strategic interactions across many different settings. Each of the sub-fields, to differing degrees, has seen game theoretic concepts enter its vocabulary, and students entering the profession will need to understand the potential and limits of game theory. This course aims to give students an entry-level understanding of the basic concepts of game theory, and how these concepts have been applied to the study of political phenomena. Because an important component of game theory in political science and political economy is the analysis of substantive political phenomena, we will cover illustrative examples each week in combination with methodological developments. The political and economic phenomena that we will examine Increasingly, political scientists are using game theory to analyze strategic interactions across many different settings. Each of the sub-fields, to differing degrees, has seen game theoretic concepts enter its vocabulary, and students entering the profession will need to understand the potential and limits of game theory. This course aims to give students an entry-level understanding of the basic concepts of game theory, and how these concepts have been applied to the study of political phenomena. Because an important component of game theory in political science and political economy is the analysis of substantive political phenomena, we will cover illustrative examples each week in combination with methodological developments. The political and economic phenomena that we will examine

Subjects

game theory | game theory | game theoretic concepts | game theoretic concepts | games of complete information | games of complete information | games of incomplete information | games of incomplete information | political phenomena | political phenomena | legislative rules | legislative rules | nuclear deterrence | nuclear deterrence | electoral competition | electoral competition | imperfect markets | imperfect markets | probability | probability | calculus | calculus

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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Introduction to microeconomics Introduction to microeconomics

Description

This is a module framework. It can be viewed online or downloaded as a zip file. As taught Semester 1 2009/2010. There are no pre-requisites to taking this module and in particular there is no assumption of any prior knowledge of economics. For those who have taken A-level economics or any other version of economics some of the module content will appear familiar to you. However, the methods of analysis and the approach to teaching will quite probably be very different to anything experienced before and thus it is very important that good lecture notes are made, essays are thoughtfully written and background reading is undertaken. If not, then a degree level of understanding of the material will not be achieved. This module is suitable for study at undergraduate level 1 Dr Wyn Morga This is a module framework. It can be viewed online or downloaded as a zip file. As taught Semester 1 2009/2010. There are no pre-requisites to taking this module and in particular there is no assumption of any prior knowledge of economics. For those who have taken A-level economics or any other version of economics some of the module content will appear familiar to you. However, the methods of analysis and the approach to teaching will quite probably be very different to anything experienced before and thus it is very important that good lecture notes are made, essays are thoughtfully written and background reading is undertaken. If not, then a degree level of understanding of the material will not be achieved. This module is suitable for study at undergraduate level 1 Dr Wyn Morga

Subjects

UNow | UNow | UKOER | UKOER | Microeconomics | Microeconomics | Microeconomic Theory | Microeconomic Theory | Consumer Theory | Consumer Theory | Consumer Welfare and the Household as Supplier | Consumer Welfare and the Household as Supplier | The Firm's Supply | The Firm's Supply | Perfectly Competitive Markets | Perfectly Competitive Markets | Imperfectly Competitive Markets | Imperfectly Competitive Markets | Market Failure | Market Failure | Economics | Economics

License

Except for third party materials (materials owned by someone other than The University of Nottingham) and where otherwise indicated, the copyright in the content provided in this resource is owned by The University of Nottingham and licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike UK 2.0 Licence (BY-NC-SA) Except for third party materials (materials owned by someone other than The University of Nottingham) and where otherwise indicated, the copyright in the content provided in this resource is owned by The University of Nottingham and licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike UK 2.0 Licence (BY-NC-SA)

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