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14.15J Networks (MIT) 14.15J Networks (MIT)

Description

Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form a Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form aSubjects

networks | networks | crowds | crowds | markets | markets | highly connected world | highly connected world | social networks | social networks | economic networks | economic networks | power networks | power networks | communication networks | communication networks | game theory | game theory | graph theory | graph theory | branching processes | branching processes | random graph models | random graph models | rich get richer phenomena | rich get richer phenomena | power laws | power laws | small worlds | small worlds | Erd?s-Renyi graphs | Erd?s-Renyi graphs | degree distributions | degree distributions | phase transitions | phase transitions | connectedness | connectedness | and giant component | and giant component | link analysis | link analysis | web search | web search | navigation | navigation | decentralized search | decentralized search | preferential attachment | preferential attachment | epidemics | epidemics | diffusion through networks | diffusion through networks | SIR | SIR | (susceptible | (susceptible | infected | infected | removed) | removed) | SIS | SIS | susceptible) | susceptible) | strategies | strategies | payoffs | payoffs | normal forms | normal forms | Nash equilibrium | Nash equilibrium | traffic networks | traffic networks | negative externalities | negative externalities | Braess' paradox | Braess' paradox | potential games | potential games | myopic behavior | myopic behavior | fictitious play | fictitious play | repeated games | repeated games | prisoner's dilemma | prisoner's dilemma | cooperation | cooperation | perfect information | perfect information | imperfect information | imperfect information | positive externalities | positive externalities | strategic complements | strategic complements | path dependence | path dependence | diffusion of innovation | diffusion of innovation | contagion pheonomena | contagion pheonomena | Bayes's rule | Bayes's rule | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | first price auctions | first price auctions | second price auctions | second price auctions | social learning | social learning | Bayesian learning | Bayesian learning | copying | copying | herding | herding | herd behavior | herd behavior | informational cascades | informational cascades | decisions | decisions | social choice | social choice | Condorcet jury theorem | Condorcet jury theorem | political economy | political economyLicense

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htmSite sourced from

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See all metadata14.01SC Principles of Microeconomics (MIT) 14.01SC Principles of Microeconomics (MIT)

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Includes audio/video content: AV lectures. 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics is an introductory undergraduate course that teaches the fundamentals of microeconomics. This course introduces microeconomic concepts and analysis, supply and demand analysis, theories of the firm and individual behavior, competition and monopoly, and welfare economics. Students will also be introduced to the use of microeconomic applications to address problems in current economic policy throughout the semester. This course is a core subject in MIT's undergraduate Energy Studies Minor. This Institute-wide program complements the deep expertise obtained in any major with a broad understanding of the interlinked realms of science, technology, and social sciences as they relate to energy and associated environmen Includes audio/video content: AV lectures. 14.01 Principles of Microeconomics is an introductory undergraduate course that teaches the fundamentals of microeconomics. This course introduces microeconomic concepts and analysis, supply and demand analysis, theories of the firm and individual behavior, competition and monopoly, and welfare economics. Students will also be introduced to the use of microeconomic applications to address problems in current economic policy throughout the semester. This course is a core subject in MIT's undergraduate Energy Studies Minor. This Institute-wide program complements the deep expertise obtained in any major with a broad understanding of the interlinked realms of science, technology, and social sciences as they relate to energy and associated environmenSubjects

Microeconomics | Microeconomics | prices | prices | normative economics | normative economics | positive economics | positive economics | microeconomic applications | microeconomic applications | supply | supply | demand | demand | equilibrium | equilibrium | demand shift | demand shift | supply shift | supply shift | government interference | government interference | elasticity | elasticity | revenue | revenue | empirical economics | empirical economics | consumer theory | consumer theory | preference assumptions | preference assumptions | indifference curves | indifference curves | utility functions | utility functions | marginal utility | marginal utility | budget constraints | budget constraints | marginal rate of transformation | marginal rate of transformation | opportunity cost | opportunity cost | constrained utility maximization | constrained utility maximization | corner solutions | corner solutions | Engel curves | Engel curves | income effect | income effect | substitution effect | substitution effect | Giffin good | Giffin good | labor economics | labor economics | child labor | child labor | producer theory | producer theory | variable inputs | variable inputs | fixed inputs | fixed inputs | firm production functions | firm production functions | marginal rate of technical substitution | marginal rate of technical substitution | returns to scale | returns to scale | productivity | productivity | perfect competition | perfect competition | search theory | search theory | residual demand | residual demand | shutdown decisions | shutdown decisions | market equilibrium | market equilibrium | agency problem | agency problem | welfare economics | welfare economics | consumer surplus | consumer surplus | producer surplus | producer surplus | dead weight loss | dead weight loss | monopoly | monopoly | oligopoly | oligopoly | market power | market power | price discrimination | price discrimination | price regulation | price regulation | antitrust policy | antitrust policy | mergers | mergers | cartel | cartel | game theory | game theory | Nash equilibrium | Nash equilibrium | Cournot model | Cournot model | duopoly | duopoly | non-cooperative competition | non-cooperative competition | Bertrand competition | Bertrand competition | factor markets | factor markets | international trade | international trade | uncertainty | uncertainty | capital markets | capital markets | intertemporal choice | intertemporal choice | real interest rate | real interest rate | compounding | compounding | inflation | inflation | investment | investment | discount rate | discount rate | net present value | net present value | income distribution | income distribution | social welfare function | social welfare function | Utilitarianism | Utilitarianism | Raulsian criteria | Raulsian criteria | Nozickian | Nozickian | commodity egalitarianism | commodity egalitarianism | isowelfare curves | isowelfare curves | social insurance | social insurance | social security | social security | moral hazard | moral hazard | taxation | taxation | EITC | EITC | healthcare | healthcare | PPACA | PPACALicense

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htmSite sourced from

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Foundations and philosophical applications of Bayesian decision theory, game theory and theory of collective choice. Why should degrees of belief be probabilities? Is it always rational to maximize expected utility? If so, why and what is its utility? What is a solution to a game? What does a game-theoretic solution concept such as Nash equilibrium say about how rational players will, or should, act in a game? How are the values and the actions of groups, institutions and societies related to the values and actions of the individuals that constitute them? Foundations and philosophical applications of Bayesian decision theory, game theory and theory of collective choice. Why should degrees of belief be probabilities? Is it always rational to maximize expected utility? If so, why and what is its utility? What is a solution to a game? What does a game-theoretic solution concept such as Nash equilibrium say about how rational players will, or should, act in a game? How are the values and the actions of groups, institutions and societies related to the values and actions of the individuals that constitute them?Subjects

decisions | decisions | games | games | rational choice | rational choice | causal decision theory | causal decision theory | social choice theory | social choice theory | Nash equilibrium | Nash equilibrium | voting | voting | game theory | game theory | dictatorial games | dictatorial games | non-dictatorial games | non-dictatorial gamesLicense

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htmSite sourced from

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See all metadataLecture 8: Strategy, Skill, and Chance, Part 1 Lecture 8: Strategy, Skill, and Chance, Part 1

Description

Description: Games contain various skill requirements, chance elements, and information availability, which guide strategy development. Changing the balance between these factors can create very different player experiences. Instructors/speakers: Philip Tan, Jason BegyKeywords: competition, strategy, game theory, roleplaying, vertigo, mimicry, ilinx, sports, alea, gameshows, randomness, games of skill, games of chance, luck, information theory, communication channel, noise, game state, card games, board games, determinism, probability, decision tree, utility, Nash equilibriumTranscript: PDFSubtitles: SRTAudio - download: Internet Archive (MP3)Audio - download: iTunes U (MP3)(CC BY-NC-SA) Description: Games contain various skill requirements, chance elements, and information availability, which guide strategy development. Changing the balance between these factors can create very different player experiences. Instructors/speakers: Philip Tan, Jason BegyKeywords: competition, strategy, game theory, roleplaying, vertigo, mimicry, ilinx, sports, alea, gameshows, randomness, games of skill, games of chance, luck, information theory, communication channel, noise, game state, card games, board games, determinism, probability, decision tree, utility, Nash equilibriumTranscript: PDFSubtitles: SRTAudio - download: Internet Archive (MP3)Audio - download: iTunes U (MP3)(CC BY-NC-SA)Subjects

competition | competition | strategy | strategy | game theory | game theory | roleplaying | roleplaying | vertigo | vertigo | mimicry | mimicry | ilinx | ilinx | sports | sports | alea | alea | gameshows | gameshows | randomness | randomness | games of skill | games of skill | games of chance | games of chance | luck | luck | information theory | information theory | communication channel | communication channel | noise | noise | game state | game state | card games | card games | board games | board games | determinism | determinism | probability | probability | decision tree | decision tree | utility | utility | Nash equilibrium | Nash equilibriumLicense

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htmSite sourced from

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Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form aSubjects

networks | crowds | markets | highly connected world | social networks | economic networks | power networks | communication networks | game theory | graph theory | branching processes | random graph models | rich get richer phenomena | power laws | small worlds | Erd?s-Renyi graphs | degree distributions | phase transitions | connectedness | and giant component | link analysis | web search | navigation | decentralized search | preferential attachment | epidemics | diffusion through networks | SIR | (susceptible | infected | removed) | SIS | susceptible) | strategies | payoffs | normal forms | Nash equilibrium | traffic networks | negative externalities | Braess' paradox | potential games | myopic behavior | fictitious play | repeated games | prisoner's dilemma | cooperation | perfect information | imperfect information | positive externalities | strategic complements | path dependence | diffusion of innovation | contagion pheonomena | Bayes's rule | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | first price auctions | second price auctions | social learning | Bayesian learning | copying | herding | herd behavior | informational cascades | decisions | social choice | Condorcet jury theorem | political economyLicense

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htmSite sourced from

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See all metadataLecture 8: Strategy, Skill, and Chance, Part 1

Description

Description: Games contain various skill requirements, chance elements, and information availability, which guide strategy development. Changing the balance between these factors can create very different player experiences. Instructors/speakers: Philip Tan, Jason BegyKeywords: competition, strategy, game theory, roleplaying, vertigo, mimicry, ilinx, sports, alea, gameshows, randomness, games of skill, games of chance, luck, information theory, communication channel, noise, game state, card games, board games, determinism, probability, decision tree, utility, Nash equilibriumTranscript: PDF (English - US)Subtitles: SRTAudio - download: Internet Archive (MP3)Audio - download: iTunes U (MP3)(CC BY-NC-SA)Subjects

competition | strategy | game theory | roleplaying | vertigo | mimicry | ilinx | sports | alea | gameshows | randomness | games of skill | games of chance | luck | information theory | communication channel | noise | game state | card games | board games | determinism | probability | decision tree | utility | Nash equilibriumLicense

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htmSite sourced from

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See all metadata14.01SC Principles of Microeconomics (MIT)

Description

14.01 Principles of Microeconomics is an introductory undergraduate course that teaches the fundamentals of microeconomics. This course introduces microeconomic concepts and analysis, supply and demand analysis, theories of the firm and individual behavior, competition and monopoly, and welfare economics. Students will also be introduced to the use of microeconomic applications to address problems in current economic policy throughout the semester. This course is a core subject in MIT's undergraduate Energy Studies Minor. This Institute-wide program complements the deep expertise obtained in any major with a broad understanding of the interlinked realms of science, technology, and social sciences as they relate to energy and associated environmental challenges.Subjects

Microeconomics | prices | normative economics | positive economics | microeconomic applications | supply | demand | equilibrium | demand shift | supply shift | government interference | elasticity | revenue | empirical economics | consumer theory | preference assumptions | indifference curves | utility functions | marginal utility | budget constraints | marginal rate of transformation | opportunity cost | constrained utility maximization | corner solutions | Engel curves | income effect | substitution effect | Giffin good | labor economics | child labor | producer theory | variable inputs | fixed inputs | firm production functions | marginal rate of technical substitution | returns to scale | productivity | perfect competition | search theory | residual demand | shutdown decisions | market equilibrium | agency problem | welfare economics | consumer surplus | producer surplus | dead weight loss | monopoly | oligopoly | market power | price discrimination | price regulation | antitrust policy | mergers | cartel | game theory | Nash equilibrium | Cournot model | duopoly | non-cooperative competition | Bertrand competition | factor markets | international trade | uncertainty | capital markets | intertemporal choice | real interest rate | compounding | inflation | investment | discount rate | net present value | income distribution | social welfare function | Utilitarianism | Raulsian criteria | Nozickian | commodity egalitarianism | isowelfare curves | social insurance | social security | moral hazard | taxation | EITC | healthcare | PPACALicense

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htmSite sourced from

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See all metadata24.222 Decisions, Games, and Rational Choice (MIT)

Description

Foundations and philosophical applications of Bayesian decision theory, game theory and theory of collective choice. Why should degrees of belief be probabilities? Is it always rational to maximize expected utility? If so, why and what is its utility? What is a solution to a game? What does a game-theoretic solution concept such as Nash equilibrium say about how rational players will, or should, act in a game? How are the values and the actions of groups, institutions and societies related to the values and actions of the individuals that constitute them?Subjects

decisions | games | rational choice | causal decision theory | social choice theory | Nash equilibrium | voting | game theory | dictatorial games | non-dictatorial gamesLicense

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htmSite sourced from

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See all metadataLecture 8: Strategy, Skill, and Chance, Part 1

Description

Description: Games contain various skill requirements, chance elements, and information availability, which guide strategy development. Changing the balance between these factors can create very different player experiences. Instructors/speakers: Philip Tan, Jason BegyKeywords: competition, strategy, game theory, roleplaying, vertigo, mimicry, ilinx, sports, alea, gameshows, randomness, games of skill, games of chance, luck, information theory, communication channel, noise, game state, card games, board games, determinism, probability, decision tree, utility, Nash equilibriumTranscript: PDFSubtitles: SRTAudio - download: Internet Archive (MP3)Audio - download: iTunes U (MP3)(CC BY-NC-SA)Subjects

competition | strategy | game theory | roleplaying | vertigo | mimicry | ilinx | sports | alea | gameshows | randomness | games of skill | games of chance | luck | information theory | communication channel | noise | game state | card games | board games | determinism | probability | decision tree | utility | Nash equilibriumLicense

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm15.S50 How to Win at Texas Hold'em Poker (MIT)

Description

Offered during MIT's Independent Activites Period (IAP), this short course covers the poker concepts, math concepts, and general concepts needed to play the game of Texas Hold'em on a professional level. IAP is a special 4-week term in January that provides members of the MIT community including students, faculty, staff, and alums with an opportunity to organize, sponsor and participate in a wide variety of activities and topics that are often outside of the regular MIT curriculum. Faculty Advisor: Paul MendeSubjects

poker | poker theory | poker analytics | strategy | tounament play | poker psychology | decision-making | gameplay | pokerstars | wagering | analytical technique | pre-flop analysis | economics | no limit | ?em | preflop | 3-betting | check-raising | floating | sizing | implied odds | polarization | ICM theory | data mining in poker | law of large numbers | Nash equilibrium | decisions vs. results | exploitative play | balanced play | risk managementLicense

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htmSite sourced from

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