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14.15J Networks (MIT) 14.15J Networks (MIT)

Description

Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form a Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form a

Subjects

networks | networks | crowds | crowds | markets | markets | highly connected world | highly connected world | social networks | social networks | economic networks | economic networks | power networks | power networks | communication networks | communication networks | game theory | game theory | graph theory | graph theory | branching processes | branching processes | random graph models | random graph models | rich get richer phenomena | rich get richer phenomena | power laws | power laws | small worlds | small worlds | Erd?s-Renyi graphs | Erd?s-Renyi graphs | degree distributions | degree distributions | phase transitions | phase transitions | connectedness | connectedness | and giant component | and giant component | link analysis | link analysis | web search | web search | navigation | navigation | decentralized search | decentralized search | preferential attachment | preferential attachment | epidemics | epidemics | diffusion through networks | diffusion through networks | SIR | SIR | (susceptible | (susceptible | infected | infected | removed) | removed) | SIS | SIS | susceptible) | susceptible) | strategies | strategies | payoffs | payoffs | normal forms | normal forms | Nash equilibrium | Nash equilibrium | traffic networks | traffic networks | negative externalities | negative externalities | Braess' paradox | Braess' paradox | potential games | potential games | myopic behavior | myopic behavior | fictitious play | fictitious play | repeated games | repeated games | prisoner's dilemma | prisoner's dilemma | cooperation | cooperation | perfect information | perfect information | imperfect information | imperfect information | positive externalities | positive externalities | strategic complements | strategic complements | path dependence | path dependence | diffusion of innovation | diffusion of innovation | contagion pheonomena | contagion pheonomena | Bayes's rule | Bayes's rule | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | first price auctions | first price auctions | second price auctions | second price auctions | social learning | social learning | Bayesian learning | Bayesian learning | copying | copying | herding | herding | herd behavior | herd behavior | informational cascades | informational cascades | decisions | decisions | social choice | social choice | Condorcet jury theorem | Condorcet jury theorem | political economy | political economy

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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6.972 Game Theory and Mechanism Design (MIT) 6.972 Game Theory and Mechanism Design (MIT)

Description

This course is offered to graduates and is an introduction to fundamentals of game theory and mechanism design with motivations drawn from various applications including distributed control of wireline and wireless communication networks, incentive-compatible/dynamic resource allocation, and pricing. Emphasis is placed on the foundations of the theory, mathematical tools, as well as modeling and the equilibrium notions in different environments. Topics covered include: normal form games, learning in games, supermodular games, potential games, dynamic games, subgame perfect equilibrium, bargaining, repeated games, auctions, mechanism design, cooperative game theory, network and congestion games, and price of anarchy. This course is offered to graduates and is an introduction to fundamentals of game theory and mechanism design with motivations drawn from various applications including distributed control of wireline and wireless communication networks, incentive-compatible/dynamic resource allocation, and pricing. Emphasis is placed on the foundations of the theory, mathematical tools, as well as modeling and the equilibrium notions in different environments. Topics covered include: normal form games, learning in games, supermodular games, potential games, dynamic games, subgame perfect equilibrium, bargaining, repeated games, auctions, mechanism design, cooperative game theory, network and congestion games, and price of anarchy.

Subjects

game theory | game theory | mechanism design | mechanism design | mathematical tools | mathematical tools | normal form games | normal form games | existence and computation of equilibria | existence and computation of equilibria | supermodular games | supermodular games | potential games | potential games | subgame perfect equilibrium | subgame perfect equilibrium | dynamic games | dynamic games | bargaining | bargaining | repeated games | repeated games | games with incomplete/imperfect information | games with incomplete/imperfect information | auctions | auctions | cooperative game theory | cooperative game theory | network and congestion games | network and congestion games | pricing | pricing | price of anarchy | price of anarchy

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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6.254 Game Theory with Engineering Applications (MIT) 6.254 Game Theory with Engineering Applications (MIT)

Description

This course is an introduction to the fundamentals of game theory and mechanism design. Motivations are drawn from engineered/networked systems (including distributed control of wireline and wireless communication networks, incentive-compatible/dynamic resource allocation, multi-agent systems, pricing and investment decisions in the Internet), and social models (including social and economic networks). The course emphasizes theoretical foundations, mathematical tools, modeling, and equilibrium notions in different environments. This course is an introduction to the fundamentals of game theory and mechanism design. Motivations are drawn from engineered/networked systems (including distributed control of wireline and wireless communication networks, incentive-compatible/dynamic resource allocation, multi-agent systems, pricing and investment decisions in the Internet), and social models (including social and economic networks). The course emphasizes theoretical foundations, mathematical tools, modeling, and equilibrium notions in different environments.

Subjects

game theory | game theory | strategic form games | strategic form games | learning | evolution | and computation | learning | evolution | and computation | extensive games with perfect information | extensive games with perfect information | repeated games | repeated games | games with incomplete information | games with incomplete information | mechanism design | mechanism design | network effects | network effects | games over networks | games over networks

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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14.461 Advanced Macroeconomics I (MIT) 14.461 Advanced Macroeconomics I (MIT)

Description

This course covers three sets of topics. The first part will cover business cycle models with imperfect information. We will ask questions such as: What shocks drive business cycles? What is the relative role of shocks to fundamentals and shocks affecting expectations about (current and future) economic developments? How do informational frictions affect the shape of the responses to various shocks? The second part will cover models of investment with credit constraints. We will ask questions such as: What is the transmission mechanism from shocks to the financial sector to the real economy? What determines optimal decisions about capitalization at the individual and at the social level? The third part will cover search models of decentralized trade applied both to labor markets and to This course covers three sets of topics. The first part will cover business cycle models with imperfect information. We will ask questions such as: What shocks drive business cycles? What is the relative role of shocks to fundamentals and shocks affecting expectations about (current and future) economic developments? How do informational frictions affect the shape of the responses to various shocks? The second part will cover models of investment with credit constraints. We will ask questions such as: What is the transmission mechanism from shocks to the financial sector to the real economy? What determines optimal decisions about capitalization at the individual and at the social level? The third part will cover search models of decentralized trade applied both to labor markets and to

Subjects

news about the future and fluctuations | news about the future and fluctuations | dispersed information | dispersed information | estimating models with imperfect information | estimating models with imperfect information | models with limited pledgeability | models with limited pledgeability | models with corporate control problems | models with corporate control problems | models with intermediation and securitization | models with intermediation and securitization | financial frictions | financial frictions | investment | investment | labor market search and inefficiency | labor market search and inefficiency | wage dispersion | wage dispersion | moral hazard | moral hazard | optimal unemployment insurance | optimal unemployment insurance | money search | money search | liquidity | liquidity | adverse selection and lemons problem | adverse selection and lemons problem | decentralized trading in financial markets | decentralized trading in financial markets

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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14.15J Networks (MIT)

Description

Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form a

Subjects

networks | crowds | markets | highly connected world | social networks | economic networks | power networks | communication networks | game theory | graph theory | branching processes | random graph models | rich get richer phenomena | power laws | small worlds | Erd?s-Renyi graphs | degree distributions | phase transitions | connectedness | and giant component | link analysis | web search | navigation | decentralized search | preferential attachment | epidemics | diffusion through networks | SIR | (susceptible | infected | removed) | SIS | susceptible) | strategies | payoffs | normal forms | Nash equilibrium | traffic networks | negative externalities | Braess' paradox | potential games | myopic behavior | fictitious play | repeated games | prisoner's dilemma | cooperation | perfect information | imperfect information | positive externalities | strategic complements | path dependence | diffusion of innovation | contagion pheonomena | Bayes's rule | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | first price auctions | second price auctions | social learning | Bayesian learning | copying | herding | herd behavior | informational cascades | decisions | social choice | Condorcet jury theorem | political economy

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

Site sourced from

https://ocw.mit.edu/rss/all/mit-allcourses.xml

Attribution

Click to get HTML | Click to get attribution | Click to get URL

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14.461 Advanced Macroeconomics I (MIT)

Description

This course covers three sets of topics. The first part will cover business cycle models with imperfect information. We will ask questions such as: What shocks drive business cycles? What is the relative role of shocks to fundamentals and shocks affecting expectations about (current and future) economic developments? How do informational frictions affect the shape of the responses to various shocks? The second part will cover models of investment with credit constraints. We will ask questions such as: What is the transmission mechanism from shocks to the financial sector to the real economy? What determines optimal decisions about capitalization at the individual and at the social level? The third part will cover search models of decentralized trade applied both to labor markets and to

Subjects

news about the future and fluctuations | dispersed information | estimating models with imperfect information | models with limited pledgeability | models with corporate control problems | models with intermediation and securitization | financial frictions | investment | labor market search and inefficiency | wage dispersion | moral hazard | optimal unemployment insurance | money search | liquidity | adverse selection and lemons problem | decentralized trading in financial markets

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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6.972 Game Theory and Mechanism Design (MIT)

Description

This course is offered to graduates and is an introduction to fundamentals of game theory and mechanism design with motivations drawn from various applications including distributed control of wireline and wireless communication networks, incentive-compatible/dynamic resource allocation, and pricing. Emphasis is placed on the foundations of the theory, mathematical tools, as well as modeling and the equilibrium notions in different environments. Topics covered include: normal form games, learning in games, supermodular games, potential games, dynamic games, subgame perfect equilibrium, bargaining, repeated games, auctions, mechanism design, cooperative game theory, network and congestion games, and price of anarchy.

Subjects

game theory | mechanism design | mathematical tools | normal form games | existence and computation of equilibria | supermodular games | potential games | subgame perfect equilibrium | dynamic games | bargaining | repeated games | games with incomplete/imperfect information | auctions | cooperative game theory | network and congestion games | pricing | price of anarchy

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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6.254 Game Theory with Engineering Applications (MIT)

Description

This course is an introduction to the fundamentals of game theory and mechanism design. Motivations are drawn from engineered/networked systems (including distributed control of wireline and wireless communication networks, incentive-compatible/dynamic resource allocation, multi-agent systems, pricing and investment decisions in the Internet), and social models (including social and economic networks). The course emphasizes theoretical foundations, mathematical tools, modeling, and equilibrium notions in different environments.

Subjects

game theory | strategic form games | learning | evolution | and computation | extensive games with perfect information | repeated games | games with incomplete information | mechanism design | network effects | games over networks

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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https://ocw.mit.edu/rss/all/mit-allcourses.xml

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