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14.42 Environmental Policy and Economics (MIT) 14.42 Environmental Policy and Economics (MIT)

Description

This course explores the proper role of government in the regulation of the environment. It will help students develop the tools to estimate the costs and benefits of environmental regulations. These tools will be used to evaluate a series of current policy questions, including: Should air and water pollution regulations be tightened or loosened? What are the costs of climate change in the U.S. and abroad? Is there a "Race to the Bottom" in environmental regulation? What is "sustainable development"? How do environmental problems differ in developing countries? Are we running out of oil and other natural resources? Should we be more energy efficient? To gain real world experience, the course is scheduled to include a visit to the MIT cogeneration plant. We will also do This course explores the proper role of government in the regulation of the environment. It will help students develop the tools to estimate the costs and benefits of environmental regulations. These tools will be used to evaluate a series of current policy questions, including: Should air and water pollution regulations be tightened or loosened? What are the costs of climate change in the U.S. and abroad? Is there a "Race to the Bottom" in environmental regulation? What is "sustainable development"? How do environmental problems differ in developing countries? Are we running out of oil and other natural resources? Should we be more energy efficient? To gain real world experience, the course is scheduled to include a visit to the MIT cogeneration plant. We will also do

Subjects

economics | economics | policy | policy | environment | environment | environmental economics | environmental economics | public policy | public policy | cost-benefit analysis | cost-benefit analysis | resource management | resource management | environmental regulation | environmental regulation | health | health | sustainability | sustainability | public goods | public goods | pollution | pollution | Pigouvian taxes | Pigouvian taxes | liability | liability | kuznets curves | kuznets curves | competition | competition | growth | growth | double dividend | double dividend | hedonic | hedonic | valuation | valuation | global warming | global warming | Porter hypothesis | Porter hypothesis | social choice | social choice | carbon offsets | carbon offsets | clean development | clean development | renewables | renewables

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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14.15J Networks (MIT) 14.15J Networks (MIT)

Description

Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form a Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form a

Subjects

networks | networks | crowds | crowds | markets | markets | highly connected world | highly connected world | social networks | social networks | economic networks | economic networks | power networks | power networks | communication networks | communication networks | game theory | game theory | graph theory | graph theory | branching processes | branching processes | random graph models | random graph models | rich get richer phenomena | rich get richer phenomena | power laws | power laws | small worlds | small worlds | Erd?s-Renyi graphs | Erd?s-Renyi graphs | degree distributions | degree distributions | phase transitions | phase transitions | connectedness | connectedness | and giant component | and giant component | link analysis | link analysis | web search | web search | navigation | navigation | decentralized search | decentralized search | preferential attachment | preferential attachment | epidemics | epidemics | diffusion through networks | diffusion through networks | SIR | SIR | (susceptible | (susceptible | infected | infected | removed) | removed) | SIS | SIS | susceptible) | susceptible) | strategies | strategies | payoffs | payoffs | normal forms | normal forms | Nash equilibrium | Nash equilibrium | traffic networks | traffic networks | negative externalities | negative externalities | Braess' paradox | Braess' paradox | potential games | potential games | myopic behavior | myopic behavior | fictitious play | fictitious play | repeated games | repeated games | prisoner's dilemma | prisoner's dilemma | cooperation | cooperation | perfect information | perfect information | imperfect information | imperfect information | positive externalities | positive externalities | strategic complements | strategic complements | path dependence | path dependence | diffusion of innovation | diffusion of innovation | contagion pheonomena | contagion pheonomena | Bayes's rule | Bayes's rule | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | first price auctions | first price auctions | second price auctions | second price auctions | social learning | social learning | Bayesian learning | Bayesian learning | copying | copying | herding | herding | herd behavior | herd behavior | informational cascades | informational cascades | decisions | decisions | social choice | social choice | Condorcet jury theorem | Condorcet jury theorem | political economy | political economy

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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24.222 Decisions, Games, and Rational Choice (MIT) 24.222 Decisions, Games, and Rational Choice (MIT)

Description

Foundations and philosophical applications of Bayesian decision theory, game theory and theory of collective choice. Why should degrees of belief be probabilities? Is it always rational to maximize expected utility? If so, why and what is its utility? What is a solution to a game? What does a game-theoretic solution concept such as Nash equilibrium say about how rational players will, or should, act in a game? How are the values and the actions of groups, institutions and societies related to the values and actions of the individuals that constitute them? Foundations and philosophical applications of Bayesian decision theory, game theory and theory of collective choice. Why should degrees of belief be probabilities? Is it always rational to maximize expected utility? If so, why and what is its utility? What is a solution to a game? What does a game-theoretic solution concept such as Nash equilibrium say about how rational players will, or should, act in a game? How are the values and the actions of groups, institutions and societies related to the values and actions of the individuals that constitute them?

Subjects

decisions | decisions | games | games | rational choice | rational choice | causal decision theory | causal decision theory | social choice theory | social choice theory | Nash equilibrium | Nash equilibrium | voting | voting | game theory | game theory | dictatorial games | dictatorial games | non-dictatorial games | non-dictatorial games

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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The political agenda: effect on service delivery

Description

This e-tivity is aimed at postgraduate health and social care students who wish to explore the factors that influence the demands for health and social care and the subsequent political agenda and consequences of a range of choices to be considered in relation to spending on the health and social care system. It is currently used by students within an MSc module. It could be adapted for students who wish to understand the political agenda, changing needs, wants and desires of people who use the health and social care system in England.

Subjects

UKOER | Political agenda | Political and social choices | Spending on health and social care | Consequences | Public Spending | Appleby J (2013) report | Subjects allied to medicine | B000

License

Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/

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14.42 Environmental Policy and Economics (MIT)

Description

This course explores the proper role of government in the regulation of the environment. It will help students develop the tools to estimate the costs and benefits of environmental regulations. These tools will be used to evaluate a series of current policy questions, including: Should air and water pollution regulations be tightened or loosened? What are the costs of climate change in the U.S. and abroad? Is there a "Race to the Bottom" in environmental regulation? What is "sustainable development"? How do environmental problems differ in developing countries? Are we running out of oil and other natural resources? Should we be more energy efficient? To gain real world experience, the course is scheduled to include a visit to the MIT cogeneration plant. We will also do

Subjects

economics | policy | environment | environmental economics | public policy | cost-benefit analysis | resource management | environmental regulation | health | sustainability | public goods | pollution | Pigouvian taxes | liability | kuznets curves | competition | growth | double dividend | hedonic | valuation | global warming | Porter hypothesis | social choice | carbon offsets | clean development | renewables

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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https://ocw.mit.edu/rss/all/mit-allcourses.xml

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14.15J Networks (MIT)

Description

Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form a

Subjects

networks | crowds | markets | highly connected world | social networks | economic networks | power networks | communication networks | game theory | graph theory | branching processes | random graph models | rich get richer phenomena | power laws | small worlds | Erd?s-Renyi graphs | degree distributions | phase transitions | connectedness | and giant component | link analysis | web search | navigation | decentralized search | preferential attachment | epidemics | diffusion through networks | SIR | (susceptible | infected | removed) | SIS | susceptible) | strategies | payoffs | normal forms | Nash equilibrium | traffic networks | negative externalities | Braess' paradox | potential games | myopic behavior | fictitious play | repeated games | prisoner's dilemma | cooperation | perfect information | imperfect information | positive externalities | strategic complements | path dependence | diffusion of innovation | contagion pheonomena | Bayes's rule | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | first price auctions | second price auctions | social learning | Bayesian learning | copying | herding | herd behavior | informational cascades | decisions | social choice | Condorcet jury theorem | political economy

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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https://ocw.mit.edu/rss/all/mit-allcourses.xml

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24.222 Decisions, Games, and Rational Choice (MIT)

Description

Foundations and philosophical applications of Bayesian decision theory, game theory and theory of collective choice. Why should degrees of belief be probabilities? Is it always rational to maximize expected utility? If so, why and what is its utility? What is a solution to a game? What does a game-theoretic solution concept such as Nash equilibrium say about how rational players will, or should, act in a game? How are the values and the actions of groups, institutions and societies related to the values and actions of the individuals that constitute them?

Subjects

decisions | games | rational choice | causal decision theory | social choice theory | Nash equilibrium | voting | game theory | dictatorial games | non-dictatorial games

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

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