Searching for strategic complements : 6 results found | RSS Feed for this search

14.15J Networks (MIT) 14.15J Networks (MIT)

Description

Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form a Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form a

Subjects

networks | networks | crowds | crowds | markets | markets | highly connected world | highly connected world | social networks | social networks | economic networks | economic networks | power networks | power networks | communication networks | communication networks | game theory | game theory | graph theory | graph theory | branching processes | branching processes | random graph models | random graph models | rich get richer phenomena | rich get richer phenomena | power laws | power laws | small worlds | small worlds | Erd?s-Renyi graphs | Erd?s-Renyi graphs | degree distributions | degree distributions | phase transitions | phase transitions | connectedness | connectedness | and giant component | and giant component | link analysis | link analysis | web search | web search | navigation | navigation | decentralized search | decentralized search | preferential attachment | preferential attachment | epidemics | epidemics | diffusion through networks | diffusion through networks | SIR | SIR | (susceptible | (susceptible | infected | infected | removed) | removed) | SIS | SIS | susceptible) | susceptible) | strategies | strategies | payoffs | payoffs | normal forms | normal forms | Nash equilibrium | Nash equilibrium | traffic networks | traffic networks | negative externalities | negative externalities | Braess' paradox | Braess' paradox | potential games | potential games | myopic behavior | myopic behavior | fictitious play | fictitious play | repeated games | repeated games | prisoner's dilemma | prisoner's dilemma | cooperation | cooperation | perfect information | perfect information | imperfect information | imperfect information | positive externalities | positive externalities | strategic complements | strategic complements | path dependence | path dependence | diffusion of innovation | diffusion of innovation | contagion pheonomena | contagion pheonomena | Bayes's rule | Bayes's rule | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | first price auctions | first price auctions | second price auctions | second price auctions | social learning | social learning | Bayesian learning | Bayesian learning | copying | copying | herding | herding | herd behavior | herd behavior | informational cascades | informational cascades | decisions | decisions | social choice | social choice | Condorcet jury theorem | Condorcet jury theorem | political economy | political economy

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

Site sourced from

http://ocw.mit.edu/rss/all/mit-allcourses.xml

Attribution

Click to get HTML | Click to get attribution | Click to get URL

All metadata

See all metadata

15.040 Game Theory for Managers (MIT) 15.040 Game Theory for Managers (MIT)

Description

This half-term course examines the choices that we make which affect others and the choices others make that affect us. Such situations are known as "games" and game-playing, while sounding whimsical, is serious business. Managers frequently play "games" both within the firm and outside it – with competitors, customers, regulators, and even capital markets! The goal of this course is to enhance a student's ability to think strategically in complex, interactive environments. Knowledge of game theory will give students an advantage in such strategic settings. The course is structured around three "themes for acquiring advantage in games": commitment / strategic moves, exploiting hidden information, and limited rationality. This half-term course examines the choices that we make which affect others and the choices others make that affect us. Such situations are known as "games" and game-playing, while sounding whimsical, is serious business. Managers frequently play "games" both within the firm and outside it – with competitors, customers, regulators, and even capital markets! The goal of this course is to enhance a student's ability to think strategically in complex, interactive environments. Knowledge of game theory will give students an advantage in such strategic settings. The course is structured around three "themes for acquiring advantage in games": commitment / strategic moves, exploiting hidden information, and limited rationality.

Subjects

game theory | game theory | strategy games | strategy games | strategic thinking | strategic thinking | business strategy | business strategy | strategic reasoning | strategic reasoning | rationality | rationality | dominant strategies | dominant strategies | first-mover advantage | first-mover advantage | conflict strategies | conflict strategies | strategic substitutes | strategic substitutes | strategic complements | strategic complements | dynamic pricing | dynamic pricing | entering new markets | entering new markets | new market entry | new market entry | brinksmanship | brinksmanship | negotiation | negotiation | negotiating | negotiating | auctions | auctions | auction theory | auction theory | revenue equivalence | revenue equivalence | bidding | bidding | information uncertainty | information uncertainty | risk manipulation | risk manipulation | adverse selection | adverse selection | moral hazard | moral hazard | strategic irrationality | strategic irrationality | prisoner's dilemma | prisoner's dilemma

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

Site sourced from

http://ocw.mit.edu/rss/all/mit-allcourses.xml

Attribution

Click to get HTML | Click to get attribution | Click to get URL

All metadata

See all metadata

15.040 Game Theory for Managers (MIT)

Description

This half-term course examines the choices that we make which affect others and the choices others make that affect us. Such situations are known as "games" and game-playing, while sounding whimsical, is serious business. Managers frequently play "games" both within the firm and outside it – with competitors, customers, regulators, and even capital markets! The goal of this course is to enhance a student's ability to think strategically in complex, interactive environments. Knowledge of game theory will give students an advantage in such strategic settings. The course is structured around three "themes for acquiring advantage in games": commitment / strategic moves, exploiting hidden information, and limited rationality.

Subjects

game theory | strategy games | strategic thinking | business strategy | strategic reasoning | rationality | dominant strategies | first-mover advantage | conflict strategies | strategic substitutes | strategic complements | dynamic pricing | entering new markets | new market entry | brinksmanship | negotiation | negotiating | auctions | auction theory | revenue equivalence | bidding | information uncertainty | risk manipulation | adverse selection | moral hazard | strategic irrationality | prisoner's dilemma

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

Site sourced from

https://ocw.mit.edu/rss/all/mit-allsimplifiedchinesecourses.xml

Attribution

Click to get HTML | Click to get attribution | Click to get URL

All metadata

See all metadata

15.040 Game Theory for Managers (MIT)

Description

This half-term course examines the choices that we make which affect others and the choices others make that affect us. Such situations are known as "games" and game-playing, while sounding whimsical, is serious business. Managers frequently play "games" both within the firm and outside it – with competitors, customers, regulators, and even capital markets! The goal of this course is to enhance a student's ability to think strategically in complex, interactive environments. Knowledge of game theory will give students an advantage in such strategic settings. The course is structured around three "themes for acquiring advantage in games": commitment / strategic moves, exploiting hidden information, and limited rationality.

Subjects

game theory | strategy games | strategic thinking | business strategy | strategic reasoning | rationality | dominant strategies | first-mover advantage | conflict strategies | strategic substitutes | strategic complements | dynamic pricing | entering new markets | new market entry | brinksmanship | negotiation | negotiating | auctions | auction theory | revenue equivalence | bidding | information uncertainty | risk manipulation | adverse selection | moral hazard | strategic irrationality | prisoner's dilemma

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

Site sourced from

https://ocw.mit.edu/rss/all/mit-allspanishcourses.xml

Attribution

Click to get HTML | Click to get attribution | Click to get URL

All metadata

See all metadata

14.15J Networks (MIT)

Description

Networks are ubiquitous in our modern society. The World Wide Web that links us to and enables information flows with the rest of the world is the most visible example. It is, however, only one of many networks within which we are situated. Our social life is organized around networks of friends and colleagues. These networks determine our information, influence our opinions, and shape our political attitudes. They also link us, often through important but weak ties, to everybody else in the United States and in the world. Economic and financial markets also look much more like networks than anonymous marketplaces. Firms interact with the same suppliers and customers and use Web-like supply chains. Financial linkages, both among banks and between consumers, companies and banks, also form a

Subjects

networks | crowds | markets | highly connected world | social networks | economic networks | power networks | communication networks | game theory | graph theory | branching processes | random graph models | rich get richer phenomena | power laws | small worlds | Erd?s-Renyi graphs | degree distributions | phase transitions | connectedness | and giant component | link analysis | web search | navigation | decentralized search | preferential attachment | epidemics | diffusion through networks | SIR | (susceptible | infected | removed) | SIS | susceptible) | strategies | payoffs | normal forms | Nash equilibrium | traffic networks | negative externalities | Braess' paradox | potential games | myopic behavior | fictitious play | repeated games | prisoner's dilemma | cooperation | perfect information | imperfect information | positive externalities | strategic complements | path dependence | diffusion of innovation | contagion pheonomena | Bayes's rule | Bayesian Nash equilibrium | first price auctions | second price auctions | social learning | Bayesian learning | copying | herding | herd behavior | informational cascades | decisions | social choice | Condorcet jury theorem | political economy

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

Site sourced from

https://ocw.mit.edu/rss/all/mit-allcourses.xml

Attribution

Click to get HTML | Click to get attribution | Click to get URL

All metadata

See all metadata

15.040 Game Theory for Managers (MIT)

Description

This half-term course examines the choices that we make which affect others and the choices others make that affect us. Such situations are known as "games" and game-playing, while sounding whimsical, is serious business. Managers frequently play "games" both within the firm and outside it – with competitors, customers, regulators, and even capital markets! The goal of this course is to enhance a student's ability to think strategically in complex, interactive environments. Knowledge of game theory will give students an advantage in such strategic settings. The course is structured around three "themes for acquiring advantage in games": commitment / strategic moves, exploiting hidden information, and limited rationality.

Subjects

game theory | strategy games | strategic thinking | business strategy | strategic reasoning | rationality | dominant strategies | first-mover advantage | conflict strategies | strategic substitutes | strategic complements | dynamic pricing | entering new markets | new market entry | brinksmanship | negotiation | negotiating | auctions | auction theory | revenue equivalence | bidding | information uncertainty | risk manipulation | adverse selection | moral hazard | strategic irrationality | prisoner's dilemma

License

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htm

Site sourced from

https://ocw.mit.edu/rss/all/mit-allcourses.xml

Attribution

Click to get HTML | Click to get attribution | Click to get URL

All metadata

See all metadata