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14.121 Microeconomic Theory I (MIT) 14.121 Microeconomic Theory I (MIT)

Description

This half-semester course provides an introduction to microeconomic theory designed to meet the needs of students in the economics Ph.D. program. Some parts of the course are designed to teach material that all graduate students should know. Others are used to introduce methodologies. Topics include consumer and producer theory, markets and competition, general equilibrium, and tools of comparative statics and their application to price theory. Some topics of recent interest may also be covered. This half-semester course provides an introduction to microeconomic theory designed to meet the needs of students in the economics Ph.D. program. Some parts of the course are designed to teach material that all graduate students should know. Others are used to introduce methodologies. Topics include consumer and producer theory, markets and competition, general equilibrium, and tools of comparative statics and their application to price theory. Some topics of recent interest may also be covered.Subjects

microeconomic theory | microeconomic theory | demand theory | demand theory | producer theory; partial equilibrium | producer theory; partial equilibrium | competitive markets | competitive markets | general equilibrium | general equilibrium | externalities | externalities | Afriat's theorem | Afriat's theorem | pricing | pricing | robust comparative statics | robust comparative statics | utility theory | utility theory | properties of preferences | properties of preferences | choice as primitive | choice as primitive | revealed preference | revealed preference | classical demand theory | classical demand theory | Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions | Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions | implications of Walras?s law | implications of Walras?s law | indirect utility functions | indirect utility functions | theorem of the maximum (Berge?s theorem) | theorem of the maximum (Berge?s theorem) | expenditure minimization problem | expenditure minimization problem | Hicksian demands | Hicksian demands | compensated law of demand | compensated law of demand | Slutsky substitution | Slutsky substitution | price changes and welfare | price changes and welfare | compensating variation | compensating variation | and welfare from new goods | and welfare from new goods | price indexes | price indexes | bias in the U.S. consumer price index | bias in the U.S. consumer price index | integrability | integrability | demand aggregation | demand aggregation | aggregate demand and welfare | aggregate demand and welfare | Frisch demands | Frisch demands | and demand estimation | and demand estimation | increasing differences | increasing differences | producer theory applications | producer theory applications | the LeCh?telier principle | the LeCh?telier principle | Topkis? theorem | Topkis? theorem | Milgrom-Shannon monotonicity theorem | Milgrom-Shannon monotonicity theorem | monopoly pricing | monopoly pricing | monopoly and product quality | monopoly and product quality | nonlinear pricing | nonlinear pricing | and price discrimination | and price discrimination | simple models of externalities | simple models of externalities | government intervention | government intervention | Coase theorem | Coase theorem | Myerson-Sattherthwaite proposition | Myerson-Sattherthwaite proposition | missing markets | missing markets | price vs. quantity regulations | price vs. quantity regulations | Weitzman?s analysis | Weitzman?s analysis | uncertainty | uncertainty | common property externalities | common property externalities | optimization | optimization | equilibrium number of boats | equilibrium number of boats | welfare theorems | welfare theorems | uniqueness and determinacy | uniqueness and determinacy | price-taking assumption | price-taking assumption | Edgeworth box | Edgeworth box | welfare properties | welfare properties | Pareto efficiency | Pareto efficiency | Walrasian equilibrium with transfers | Walrasian equilibrium with transfers | Arrow-Debreu economy | Arrow-Debreu economy | separating hyperplanes | separating hyperplanes | Minkowski?s theorem | Minkowski?s theorem | Existence of Walrasian equilibrium | Existence of Walrasian equilibrium | Kakutani?s fixed point theorem | Kakutani?s fixed point theorem | Debreu-Gale-Kuhn-Nikaido lemma | Debreu-Gale-Kuhn-Nikaido lemma | additional properties of general equilibrium | additional properties of general equilibrium | Microfoundations | Microfoundations | core | core | core convergence | core convergence | general equilibrium with time and uncertainty | general equilibrium with time and uncertainty | Jensen?s inequality | Jensen?s inequality | and security market economy | and security market economy | arbitrage pricing theory | arbitrage pricing theory | and risk-neutral probabilities | and risk-neutral probabilities | Housing markets | Housing markets | competitive equilibrium | competitive equilibrium | one-sided matching house allocation problem | one-sided matching house allocation problem | serial dictatorship | serial dictatorship | two-sided matching | two-sided matching | marriage markets | marriage markets | existence of stable matchings | existence of stable matchings | incentives | incentives | housing markets core mechanism | housing markets core mechanismLicense

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htmSite sourced from

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See all metadata14.147 Topics in Game Theory (MIT) 14.147 Topics in Game Theory (MIT)

Description

This course is an advanced topics course on market and mechanism design. We will study existing or new market institutions, understand their properties, and think about whether they can be re-engineered or improved. Topics discussed include mechanism design, auction theory, one-sided matching in house allocation, two-sided matching, stochastic matching mechanisms, student assignment, and school choice. This course is an advanced topics course on market and mechanism design. We will study existing or new market institutions, understand their properties, and think about whether they can be re-engineered or improved. Topics discussed include mechanism design, auction theory, one-sided matching in house allocation, two-sided matching, stochastic matching mechanisms, student assignment, and school choice.Subjects

game theory | game theory | mechanism design | mechanism design | auction theory | auction theory | one-sided matching | one-sided matching | house allocation | house allocation | market problems | market problems | two-sided matching | two-sided matching | stability | stability | many-to-one | many-to-one | one-to-one | one-to-one | small cores | small cores | large markets | large markets | stochastic matching mechanisms | stochastic matching mechanisms | student assignment | student assignment | school choice | school choice | resale markets | resale markets | dynamics | dynamics | simplicity | simplicity | robustness | robustness | limited rationality | limited rationality | message spaces | message spaces | sharing risk | sharing risk | decentralized exchanges | decentralized exchanges | over-the-counter exchanges | over-the-counter exchangesLicense

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see http://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htmSite sourced from

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See all metadata14.147 Topics in Game Theory (MIT)

Description

This course is an advanced topics course on market and mechanism design. We will study existing or new market institutions, understand their properties, and think about whether they can be re-engineered or improved. Topics discussed include mechanism design, auction theory, one-sided matching in house allocation, two-sided matching, stochastic matching mechanisms, student assignment, and school choice.Subjects

game theory | mechanism design | auction theory | one-sided matching | house allocation | market problems | two-sided matching | stability | many-to-one | one-to-one | small cores | large markets | stochastic matching mechanisms | student assignment | school choice | resale markets | dynamics | simplicity | robustness | limited rationality | message spaces | sharing risk | decentralized exchanges | over-the-counter exchangesLicense

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htmSite sourced from

https://ocw.mit.edu/rss/all/mit-allcourses.xmlAttribution

Click to get HTML | Click to get attribution | Click to get URLAll metadata

See all metadata14.121 Microeconomic Theory I (MIT)

Description

This half-semester course provides an introduction to microeconomic theory designed to meet the needs of students in the economics Ph.D. program. Some parts of the course are designed to teach material that all graduate students should know. Others are used to introduce methodologies. Topics include consumer and producer theory, markets and competition, general equilibrium, and tools of comparative statics and their application to price theory. Some topics of recent interest may also be covered.Subjects

microeconomic theory | demand theory | producer theory; partial equilibrium | competitive markets | general equilibrium | externalities | Afriat's theorem | pricing | robust comparative statics | utility theory | properties of preferences | choice as primitive | revealed preference | classical demand theory | Kuhn-Tucker necessary conditions | implications of Walras?s law | indirect utility functions | theorem of the maximum (Berge?s theorem) | expenditure minimization problem | Hicksian demands | compensated law of demand | Slutsky substitution | price changes and welfare | compensating variation | and welfare from new goods | price indexes | bias in the U.S. consumer price index | integrability | demand aggregation | aggregate demand and welfare | Frisch demands | and demand estimation | increasing differences | producer theory applications | the LeCh?telier principle | Topkis? theorem | Milgrom-Shannon monotonicity theorem | monopoly pricing | monopoly and product quality | nonlinear pricing | and price discrimination | simple models of externalities | government intervention | Coase theorem | Myerson-Sattherthwaite proposition | missing markets | price vs. quantity regulations | Weitzman?s analysis | uncertainty | common property externalities | optimization | equilibrium number of boats | welfare theorems | uniqueness and determinacy | price-taking assumption | Edgeworth box | welfare properties | Pareto efficiency | Walrasian equilibrium with transfers | Arrow-Debreu economy | separating hyperplanes | Minkowski?s theorem | Existence of Walrasian equilibrium | Kakutani?s fixed point theorem | Debreu-Gale-Kuhn-Nikaido lemma | additional properties of general equilibrium | Microfoundations | core | core convergence | general equilibrium with time and uncertainty | Jensen?s inequality | and security market economy | arbitrage pricing theory | and risk-neutral probabilities | Housing markets | competitive equilibrium | one-sided matching house allocation problem | serial dictatorship | two-sided matching | marriage markets | existence of stable matchings | incentives | housing markets core mechanismLicense

Content within individual OCW courses is (c) by the individual authors unless otherwise noted. MIT OpenCourseWare materials are licensed by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology under a Creative Commons License (Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike). For further information see https://ocw.mit.edu/terms/index.htmSite sourced from

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